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Abstract
This paper complements research on how love of wealth bears on key variables in
a Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans growth framework. It is shown that for an optimum
the social planner cannot have an excessive love of wealth. If the planner has the
‘right’ love of wealth an optimum exists and implies higher long-run per capita
capital, income and consumption relative to the standard optimal growth model.
The optimum implies dynamic efficiency with the possibility to get arbitrarily
close to the Golden Rule where long-run per capita consumption is maximal. It
is shown that the optimal path is attaining its steady state more slowly. Thus, the
beneficial effects of love of wealth materialize later than in the standard model.
Furthermore, the economy can be decentralized as a competitive private owner-
ship economy. One can then identify love of wealth with the “spirit of capital-
ism”. The paper, hence, implies that one needs a ’right’ level of the “spirit of
capitalism” to realize any beneficial effects for the long run.
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1 Introduction
It is generally recognized that people derive satisfaction from the holding of wealth.
For instance, Weber (1930) and Pigou (1941) argue that individuals derive utility from
the mere possession of wealth and not simply its expenditure.1 Clearly, putting wealth
directly into the welfare (utility) function may allow to capture important and quite
realistic aspects of investment behaviour.2
Of course, investment behaviour is related to economic growth. In a seminal arti-
cle Kurz (1968) has analyzed an optimal growth model in the spirit of Ramsey (1928),
Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965) where agents’ utility includes utility from holding
wealth. Keeping the analysis quite general Kurz shows that many different and com-
plicated equilibria and transition dynamics may occur. Unfortunately, his paper does
not present much economic intuition for his mathematical findings.
Simplified versions of his analysis were subsequently complemented by more eco-
nomic interpretations. For example, Zou (1994), Bakshi and Chen (1996) and Carroll
(2000) relate to MaxWeber and argue that the dependence of utility on wealth captures
the “spirit of capitalism”. Zou uses absolute, and Bakshi and Chen relative wealth in
their setups. In this paper I primarily relate to Zou’s optimal, neoclassical growth
framework.
For the latter it is well known that the long-run equilibrium obeys the Modified
Golden Rule, under which the steady state capital stock is lower than the one associated
with the Golden Rule, derived by Phelps (1961), which would yield maximum long-
run, per capita consumption. Zou (1994) shows that utility derived from consumption
1For example, an early contribution that introduced wealth in the utility function in order to model
investment behaviour is Markowitz (1952). For recent papers that include love of wealth in their models
see, for example, Kaplow (2009) and Kumhof and Rancie`re (2010).
2One question is whether it is the relative wealth or the absolute wealth that enters utility. The former
allows to concentrate on status concerns, while the latter focuses on a form of ‘pure’ love of wealth.
Both approaches can be found in the literature and I will relate to them below.
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and capital, where the latter is called love of wealth (LOW) in this paper, leads to an
optimal path with a higher, steady state capital stock than under the Modified Golden
Rule. Corneo and Jeanne (1997) and Corneo and Jeanne (2001) show in an endogenous
growth framework that love of (relative) wealth (“social status concerns” in their paper)
can lead to an accumulation path that may even obey the Golden Rule. They also show
that it is possible that too much love of wealth would entail overaccumulation and
would be socially undesirable. This is usually called “dynamically inefficient”.
Against this background the present paper derives complementary results. In order
to obtain those the paper concentrates on a simple logarithmic utility, Cobb-Douglas
technology economy with a social planner that derives utility from per capita wealth
and consumption. Thus, the model builds on Ramsey (1928), Cass (1965) and Koop-
mans (1965) who also analyze the problem of a central planning authority (social plan-
ner).3 This makes it possible to get clean analytic expressions that serve to capture the
essence of what love of wealth in a Solow (1956) growth context might imply. The
analysis concentrates on steady states, but additionally on transitional dynamics which
some earlier contributions have often not focussed on.4
In this context, the model yields the following results. There is no optimal accu-
mulation path when there is excessive love of wealth. As the model’s social planner
is taken to care about both per capita consumption and wealth, an excessive zeal for
accumulation would entail reductions in long-run consumption. Intuitively, the crave
for building ever more pyramids would have to be met with lower consumption in the
long run. As intuition suggests this is not a long-run optimum.
3Later in the paper we will look at the implication of the paper’s results for decentralized economies.
The advantage to work with a social planner is that it may capture more general economic arrangements,
of which a competitive decentralization is just one possibility.
4For instance, Wirl (1994) concentrates on transitional dynamics and the possibility of growth cy-
cles when wealth enters utility. However, his paper concentrates rather on stability properties of such
economies. In the present paper the focus is more on steady state properties and the speed of conver-
gence in relation to standard optimal growth models.
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There exists a critical level of the love of wealth (LOW) below which optimal paths
exist. These paths are such that in a steady state per capita wealth and consumption
would be higher than in an economy where there is no LOW. Thus, somewhat surpris-
ingly, having the ‘right’ craving for capital also leads to higher long-run consumption.
In that sense love of wealth is quite beneficial. It implies that a simple preference shift
from non-LOW to LOW allows for a better material situation, even for the consumers.
However, in relative terms this is not so, because, even though the cake will be big-
ger, the steady state consumption share will be lower, the investment share higher and
the return to capital lower in a LOW economy in comparison to the standard, optimal
growth (non-LOW) economy.5
In this model the LOWwhich implies optimal paths is always accompanied by “dy-
namic efficiency”. In fact, (arbitrarily) close to the critical level of the love of wealth,
the capital stock implied by the Golden Rule and that chosen by a social planner with
a LOW near that critical level would be almost identical. The reason is that in a stan-
dard optimal growth (non-LOW) model, impatience (the rate of time preference) is
such that a steady state capital stock is chosen that is less than the one that maximizes
steady state consumption. Love of wealth provides a counteracting effect. Thus, it is
possible, even in a neoclassical, optimal growth context, to get arbitrarily close to the
Golden Rule. Hence, the model implies some form of tradeoff between impatience
and love of wealth. Less patience can be compensated by more love of wealth if one
wants to have the same level of steady state capital.
Next, by log-linearizing the economy with LOW preferences around its steady
state it shown that the economy features saddle path stability. This is not too surpris-
ing, given the model’s structure. However, an interesting finding here is that conver-
5Empirically this implies that economies may exhibit quite different long-run income levels in a
cross section. According to the model this would be entirely due to preference and not technology
differences.
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gence in an economy with LOW preferences occurs more slowly than in the standard
non-LOW case. Thus, two economies with these differences in preferences would con-
verge differently to their respective steady states. The economy with LOW preferences
would take longer, but have a higher capital stock in the long run.6
This allows one to argue that transitions of economies can be seen as having been
started off by preference shifts. Suppose an economy without LOW preferences were
in its steady state. Now assume that the social planner suddenly starts loving wealth
and continues to do so forever. In a qualitative analysis using a phase diagram it
turns out that taking the former steady state capital stock as the initial capital stock
for getting into the new equilibrium reveals the following quite intuitive results. The
economy will jump onto its new saddle path with lower consumption and higher in-
vestment, compared to the previous regime with no LOW. So on impact consumers
will suffer as more investment is needed to obtain the new and higher steady state cap-
ital stock associated with LOW preferences. There will be one point in time where
the consumers will be just as well off as before the preference shift. After that date
consumers will unambiguously benefit from the preference shift.
These results are interesting because they may contribute to explanations what may
have happened in transition economies. Examples that may come to mind are the
Eastern European countries, Russia, China, India etc. For example, the model may
contribute to explanations why China, India and other economies have had such high
investment rates over a longer period.
The logic of preference shifts towards capital might also apply to historical con-
texts. Here the claim is that preference shifts, similar to those analyzed here, were at
work in the take-offs shortly before and during the Industrial Revolution. Of course,
the model is too coarse to capture that in detail, but it may serve to highlight the
6To my knowledge of the literature this appears to be a novel finding. Of course, it holds only under
the assumptions made.
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possibility of contemplating preference shifts as (perhaps additional) initial movers of
economic transitions.
Next, the paper invokes the second welfare theorem and argues that the contem-
plated economy can be decentralized as a competitive general equilibrium of a private
ownership economy. See, for example, Acemoglu (2009), ch. 5. Thus, the social
planner solution can quite straightforwardly be turned into the outcome of a market
economy, given the assumptions about preferences and technology. This would re-
quire that the agents would have to have the same preferences as the social planner
contemplated in this paper and where the social planner would have represented the
agents’ welfare in a benevolent way. Thus, under these circumstances all the results
under the planner’s solution would also hold for the decentralized economy.
For the decentralized economy one may reasonably interpret the more general term
“love of wealth” as representing the “spirit of capitalism” as in, for example, Zou
(1994).7 Thus, for a competitive market economy we may then conclude that the
‘right‘ level of the “spirit of capitalism” is good in terms of long-run income and
consumption. But it may take a little longer to realize these effects in comparison to an
economy with less of that spirit. Furthermore, distinct (‘right’) “spirits of capitalism”
may yield quite different economic outcomes in the long-run.8
However, one of the paper’s main insights is that an excessive “spirit of capitalism”
is not good and cannot really be realized as a long-run optimum in a dynamic economy.
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 present the model and de-
rive the social planner’s optimal decision rules. Sections 4 and 5 analyze the steady
state, and the transitional dynamics. Section 6 discusses decentralization, and section
7 concludes.
7Notice that Zou contemplates a decentralized economy and sometimes uses a single, constant pa-
rameter, as in the present paper, to represent the “spirit of capitalism”.
8That there are different forms of capitalism is, of course, well known. See, for example, Hall and
Soskice (eds.) (2001).
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2 The Model
The economy consists of a social planner, and many infinitely-lived individuals. The
population is normalized so that we can think of the economy as consisting or a rep-
resentative consumer. The model abstracts from uncertainty, technological progress,
and population growth. By assumption the agents supply one unit of unskilled labour
inelastically.
The social planner is taken to care about the representative individual, and faces
the following resource constraint
k(t)
dt
= y(t)− c(t)− δk(t) (1)
where k(t) denotes the (per capita) capital stock, y(t) is per capita income and c(t)
per capita consumption. Furthermore, δ represents the constant depreciation rate of
physical capital.9
The social planner has access to a technology which features constant returns to
scale where aggregate output Y (t) is produced using capital and labour, i.e. Y (t) =
F (K(t), L(t)) where K(t) and L(t) denote the aggregate capital stock and labour
input, respectively. For simplicity we consider a Cobb-Douglas economy with
Y (t) = K(t)αL(t)1−α, where 0 < α < 1.
Then we know that per capita output y(t) ≡ Y (t)/(L(t) is given by
y(t) = f(k(t)) = k(t)α (2)
9We denote
dk(t)
dt
by ˙k(t). Partial derivatives will be denoted by subscripts, for instance, for a
function f(x) we let fx ≡
∂f
∂x
, all evaluated at time t.
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where k(t) ≡ K(t)/L(t) and we assume that there is full employment so that the
population equals the number of persons working.
The social planner rewards factors according to their marginal products. Denoting
the reward to capital by r(t) and that for labour by w(t) one gets10
r(t) = αk(t)α−1 and w(t) = f(k(t))− r(t)k(t) = (1− α)k(t)α (3)
where the latter equality follows from the assumption of constant returns to scale.
From now on I will drop the indication that variables depend on time for conve-
nience. When there may be cases where it needs to be made explicit, I will do so.
3 A Wealth-Loving Social Planner
Consider a social planner that maximizes an intertemporal utility stream subject to
the economy’s resource constraint in (1). The welfare stream for the social planner is
given by
∫ ∞
0
u(c, k) e−ρtdt
where we assume the following for the period utility function u(·)
uc > 0, ucc < 0, uk > 0 and ukk < 0.
lim
c→0
uc =∞, lim
c→∞
uc = 0, lim
k→0
uk =∞ and lim
k→∞
uk = 0.
Thus, period utility depends in a conventional way on (per capita) consumption c.
What is different from usual problems is the fact that we assume that the social planner
10Under competitive conditions und profit maximization the rates of return for capital and the wage
rate would also equal the marginal products.
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derives welfare from (per capita) wealth (capital).11 Thus, u(·) is a function of k. This
captures the fact that many people attach some value to wealth and capital per se. For
instance, many people like to look at impressive buildings (e.g. the Eiffel Tower, or the
Empire State Building etc.) and derive utility from that. Also, many firms offer guided
tours through their often very impressive plants of production such as e.g. the Boeing
assembly halls in Seattle or Volkswagen’s “Auto Manufaktur” in Dresden.
The assumption that welfare is increasing in wealth is perhaps more problematic.
Clearly, there are cases where additional capital may be valued less. An example may
be the construction of an additional nuclear power plant. However, k is an index of all
sorts of capital stocks. Most evidence would suggest that people generally like wealth
and especially more of it. Otherwise, they would not do the things one can observe
to increase their wealth. Of course, this is a perennial phenomenon. Thus, drawing
on this ‘stylized fact’ may justify the assumption that welfare is increasing in wealth,
uk > 0.
The next assumption states that the marginal welfare of wealth is decreasing. Thus,
the welfare gain becomes smaller as wealth increases. This may capture the observa-
tion that very rich people often say that an additional “palazzo” may not make them
much happier, especially in comparison to the first one they already call their own.
The Inada conditions on welfare’s reaction on the effects of wealth when there is
hardly any or too much capital are not really necessary for most of the analysis below,
but can be rationalized on quite intuitive grounds. For example, lim
k→0
uk = ∞ would
say that one is really craving for wealth if one does not have any. Here the claim is
that many people would support that view. In turn, lim
k→∞
uk = 0 would imply that Bill
11Notice there is a literature that makes preferences dependent on relative wealth. There is basic
idea is that optimizers are comparing themselves with others. Here that most interesting question is not
taken up. Instead we focus on a planner that only looks at his or her own wealth. But this allows for
comparisons, too, because below we will conduct comparative static exercises by which one contrasts
planners with a higher and a lower preference for wealth.
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Gates does not really care if he gets an additional computer.
With all these assumptions the social planner’s problem really becomes
max
c
∫ ∞
0
u(c, k) e−ρtdt
s.t. k˙ = f(k)− c− δk; k0 > 0 and given.
A general problem of this kind is studied by Kurz (1968). He shows that many different
trajectories may or may not lead to balanced growth paths. The potential solutions of
this problem depend on the exact form of the period utility function u(c, k), and, in
particular, on the assumed substitution of consumption and capital in period utility.
In this paper one of the main questions that is being analyzed is how the steady
state and the speed of convergence are affected when moving from a regime where
the social planner does not love capital to one where he or she does. To analyze that
question I will restrict the analysis to the log-utility case under the assumption that the
period utility derived from capital and consumption are separable. Thus, it is assumed
that the social planner values each marginal increment of one component of utility
essentially independently of the increment of the other component. Thus, consider the
following period utility function
u(c, k) = ln c+ γ ln k where γ ∈ [0,∞). (4)
One easily verifies that this period utility function satisfies all the properties that the
more general setup requires. Here γ measures the preference of the social planner for
wealth (capital) in comparison to that for consumption. If γ = 0, the social planner
attaches no direct value to capital. If γ → ∞, the social planner is only concerned
about capital.
Thus, under the assumption of the period utility function in equation (4) the social
9
planner’s problem is given by
max
c
∫ ∞
0
[ln c+ γ ln k] e−ρtdt
s.t. k˙ = f(k)− c− δk, k0 = given.
(5)
where ρ represents the constant rate of time preference.
The solution to this problem is obtained from the current value Hamiltonian
H = [ln c+ γ ln k] + λ [f(k)− c− δk]
and the first order necessary conditions for its maximization entail the following equa-
tions have to be fulfilled
uc = λ (6)
λ˙ = λρ− uk − λ(f
′ − δ) (7)
plus the requirement that the resource constraint in (1) and the transversality condition
lim
t→∞
kλe−ρt = 0 be satisfied.12
Under the assumptions made equations (6) and (7) can then be rearranged to find
the social planner’s optimal consumption growth rate
c˙
c
= f ′(k) + uk/uc − (ρ+ δ) = f
′(k) + γ ·
c
k
− (ρ+ δ). (8)
Notice that, as is standard, consumption growth depends on the return to capital and
the rate of time preference. Additionally, in this model the marginal rate of substitution
(in welfare) between consumption and wealth matters too. In our log-utility case this
12One easily verifies that the Hamiltonian is concave in c and k so that by Mangasarian’s Theorem
the sufficient conditions for a maximum would also be be satisfied.
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is given by − dc
dk
= uk
uc
= γ · c
k
and has a positive bearing on the (optimal) consumption
growth rate. Furthermore, we note that, if there is positive consumption growth, the
marginal product will be lower than in a conventional optimal growth model, where it
would equal the sum of the depreciation and the time preference rate.
3.1 The transversality condition
The optimal consumption plan requires that the value of capital be zero at the end of
the planning horizon. That imposes the requirement that
lim
t→∞
kt · λt · e
−ρt = 0 (9)
hold. From equation (7) we know
λ˙ = λ(−f ′ + (ρ+ δ))−
γ
k
.
Integrating this expression from time 0 up to time t yields
λt = e
∫
t
0
(ρ−f ′(kv)+δ)dv
(
λ0 −
∫ t
0
(
γ
ks
)
e−
∫
s
0
(ρ−f ′(kv)+δ)dvds
)
.
Inserting this into the transversality condition in (9) yields
lim
t→∞
kt · e
∫
t
0
(ρ−f ′(kv)+δ)dv
(
λ0 −
∫ t
0
(
γ
ks
)
e−
∫
s
0
(ρ−f ′(kv)+δ)dvds
)
· e−ρt = 0.
as the condition to be satisfied. Noting that e
∫
t
0
ρdv = e−ρt we get
lim
t→∞
kt · e
−
∫
t
0
(f ′(kv)−δ)dv ·
(
λ0 −
∫ t
0
(
γ
ks
)
e−
∫
s
0
(ρ−f ′(kv)+δ)dvds
)
= 0.
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Clearly, this condition is equivalent to
lim
t→∞
kt · lim
t→∞
e−
∫
t
0
(f ′(kv)−δ)dv ·
(
λ0 − lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
(
γ
ks
)
e−
∫
s
0
(ρ−f ′(kv)+δ)dvds
)
= 0.
Jumping ahead it will turn out that in a long-run equilibrium lim
t→∞
kt = k
∗ < ∞, that
is, the steady state capital stock k∗ will be finite. Then the product of the other limits
must vanish asymptotically. With a finite capital stock in the long-run equilibrium the
second limit requires lim
t→∞
e−
∫
t
0
(f ′(kv)−δ)dv = 0 so that f ′(k∞) > δ in equilibrium is
needed and k∞ = k
∗. See appendix A for more details. λ0 is a finite and positive num-
ber. Thus, the product of λ0, the first and the second limit will be zero asymptotically,
if f ′(k∗) > δ.
As regards the third limit it is shown in appendix A that the integral
∫ ∞
0
(
γ
ks
)
e−
∫
s
0
(ρ−f ′(kv)+δ)dvds
converges to a finite number. Thus, the product of this and the other two limits will be
zero asymptotically, if f ′(k∗) > δ, so that the transversality condition is indeed met.
Lemma 1 The transversality condition requires that f ′(k∗) > δ where k∗ denotes the
steady state capital stock.
As will be shown in more detail below, this is true in the steady state. The lemma
has the important implication that optimality requires that the social planner choose a
dynamically efficient solution.
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4 The steady state
In the long-run, steady state equilibrium with balanced growth the economy is char-
acterized by the condition k˙/k = c˙/c = 0. Using (1) and (8) for k˙/k = c˙/c requires
that
f ′(k)− (ρ+ δ) + γ
c
k
=
f(k)
k
−
c
k
− δ
(γ + 1)c = f(k)− f ′(k) · k + ρk
c∗ = (w + ρk)
(
1
γ + 1
)
(10)
holds. Thus, consumption in steady state, c∗, depends on wage income and capital
income net of investment outlays and on the welfare weight γ, which captures the
preference for capital. For given w, ρ and k, steady state consumption c∗ is decreasing
in γ. This would suggest that a social planner that has a higher liking for capital would
choose accumulation such that steady state consumption is lower. However, higher γ
also implies more capital in the steady state and that effect is captured by the following
arguments.
First notice that k˙ = 0 implies that steady state consumption must also satisfy
c∗ = f(k)− δk. (11)
From this, i.e. equation (10) and (11) we can determine the steady state capital stock
k∗ as satisfying
(f(k)− f ′(k) · k + ρ · k)) ·
(
1
1 + γ
)
= f(k)− δk
where, of course, w = f(k)− f ′(k) ·k. For our Cobb-Douglas economy we know that
13
f(k) = kα, and f ′(k) = αkα−1. Thus,
(1− α)kα−1 + ρ = (1 + γ)kα−1 − δ(1 + γ).
Then it is not difficult to verify that the steady state capital stock is given by
k∗ =
(
α + γ
(γ + 1)δ + ρ
) 1
1−α
. (12)
and is increasing in γ. Thus, placing more welfare on capital holdings leads to a
higher capital stock in the steady state. This does not seem very surprising. From this
it follows that in an economy where there is a higher γ, the real return to capital in the
steady state will be lower.
As “love for wealth” affects c∗ through a direct and an indirect channel (through its
effect on k∗) it is interesting to know what the condition is so that more capital raises
overall steady state consumption. Now c∗ = f(k∗)− δk∗ must hold in the steady state.
Consumption c∗ changes with γ according to
dc∗
dγ
= f ′(k∗) ·
∂k∗
∂γ
− δ
∂k∗
∂γ
.
We know that ∂k
∗
∂γ
> 0. Thus, the reaction of c∗ depends on
dc∗
dγ
R 0 iff f ′(k∗) R δ.
Lemma 2 If f ′(k∗) = δ, then steady state consumption would be maximized and the
“Golden Rule” of capital accumulation would be satisfied.
But from lemma 1 we know that the transversality condition requires f ′(k∗) > δ.
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Thus, this boils down to
f ′(k) = αk∗α−1 > δ that is,
α[(γ + 1)δ + ρ]
α + γ
> δ.
Simplification then reveals that γ has to satisfy
γ̂ ≡
α
1− α
·
ρ
δ
> γ. (13)
Thus, if this condition is satisfied consumption and the capital stock in the steady
state are higher than in an economy that does not feature love of wealth, i.e. where
γ = 0. Up to γ̂ an increase in the love of wealth is accompanied by higher con-
sumption and more physical capital in the steady state. Notice that the transversality
condition requires that γ is smaller than γ̂. Interestingly, if γ equalled γ̂, then steady
state consumption would be maximized with respect to γ. One easily verifies that if
γ = γ̂, consumption would be maximal and the Golden Rule would hold. In this sim-
ple model we would then get the textbook condition that the the marginal product of
capital equals the depreciation rate.
In this context it is well known that the welfare discount factor (the time preference
rate ρ) leads one to choose a (steady state) consumption level that is smaller than the
maximal one, i.e. the one that is associated with the Golden Rule. The reason is
that ρ also captures impatience and so it is optimal in a Ramsey model to consume
more today at the expense of higher consumption in the future. That implies a lower
level of steady state consumption. In this model it is found that love of wealth is a
counteracting force. In the limit when the social planner would have a love of wealth
that is extremely close to γ̂, the social optimum would be to pursue an accumulation
path that is almost equal to the one satisfying the Golden Rule.13
13If γ is very close to γ̂ one may then be unable to distinguish empirically between a simple Solow
15
This holds, even if the the planner is more impatient. In this model more impatience
(higher ρ) can be compensated in terms of steady state consumption by a higher γ as
long as γ̂ > γ is satisfied.
Of course, higher consumption and more capital in the steady sate can only be
accomplished if the investment share is higher. Under the condition γ̂ > γ, we find
that the consumption share in steady state is
c∗
y∗
=
f(k∗)− δk∗
f(k∗)
= 1− δk∗1−α where y = f(k∗) = k∗α,
which will be lower for an economy with a higher γ. Consequently, the long-run
investment share is higher in an economy where there is love of wealth.
Proposition 1 More “love of wealth” (higher γ) increases the steady state capital
stock k∗ and implies a relatively lower steady state return to capital. It raises steady
state consumption c∗ if γ is not too large, that is, when γ < α
1−α
· ρ
δ
≡ γ̂. If γ is very
close, but still less than γ̂, the accumulation path will almost obey the Golden Rule.
However, if the love of wealth is too large (γ > γ̂), then an increase in γ would lower
steady state consumption c∗ in comparison to the maximum one, but then no optimum
exists. The social planner always chooses a dynamically efficient accumulation path in
the optimum. Furthermore, the optimal plan implies that an economy with more love
of wealth will have a lower consumption and a higher investment share in the steady
state.
The proposition is interesting for the following reasons. The social planner’s opti-
mal policy is incompatible with an excessive love of wealth in the long run. A ’right’
level of the love of wealth will lead to higher steady state consumption than when there
model with an exogenous savings rate that followed the Golden Rule, and a Ramsey model with en-
dogenous savings decisions featuring time preference and love of wealth.
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is no love of wealth. If γ were too large, then a social planner would overaccumulate
at the expense of consumption. This is not viable as an equilibrium.14 A benevolent
planner with the ’right’ level of the love of wealth would not choose overaccumulation
because she or he sees the potential for growth and higher consumption. By this rea-
soning the ’right’ love of wealth is eventually beneficial for people and even though it
implies a lower consumption share in the steady state. Clearly, these features of the
model are in principle empirically testable. However, as the beneficial effect material-
izes only in a new steady state when γ is raised from γ = 0, one has to analyze what
happens in the transition.
5 Transitional dynamics
For γ ∈ [0, αρ
(1−α)δ
) the transitional dynamics of the economy can be described by the
following two-dimensional system.
k˙
k
=
f(k)
k
−
c
k
− δ and
c˙
c
= f ′(k)− (ρ+ δ) + γ
c
k
plus the initial condition k0 > 0 and the requirement that the transversality condition
is met. For our Cobb-Douglas production case with y = f(k) = kα and y′ = f ′(k) =
αkα−1 we then get for the equations of motion
k˙
k
= kα−1 −
c
k
− δ and
c˙
c
= αkα−1 − (ρ+ δ) + γ
c
k
.
14In the most extreme case when γ → ∞, enslavement would ensue because the people would
eventually die while producing more and consuming less, for example, by building ever more pyramids.
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We will now log-linearize this system of equations around the steady state. Expressing
the last expression in (natural) logs yields
d ln k
dt
= e−(1−α) ln k − eln(c/k) − δ (14)
d ln c
dt
= αe−(1−α) ln k + γeln(c/k) − (ρ+ δ). (15)
In steady state we have d ln k
dt
= d ln c
dt
= 0 so that
e−(1−α) ln k − eln(c/k) = δ (16)
αe−(1−α) ln k + γeln(c/k) = ρ+ δ (17)
have to hold. Solving for the steady state values yields
eln(c/k) = ρ+(1−α)δ
α+γ
(18)
e−(1−α) ln k = δ(1+γ)+ρ
α+γ
. (19)
Now we linearize (14) and (15) to get
d ln kdt
d ln c
dt
 = ∆ ·
d ln k
d ln c

where d ln k = ln k − ln k∗ = ln(k/k∗) and d ln c = ln c− ln c∗ = ln(c/c∗) and
∆ ≡
∆11 ∆12
∆21 ∆22
 ≡
 −(1− α)e−(1−α) ln k + eln(c/k) −eln(c/k)
−α(1− α)e−(1−α) ln k − γeln(c/k) γeln(c/k)

c∗, k∗
denotes the Jacobian of the system when in equilibrium. Evaluation at the steady state
yields after substitution of equations (18) and (19), rearrangement and simplification
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that15
∆11 =
αρ−(1−α)γδ
α+γ
∆12 = −
ρ+(1−α)δ
α+γ
∆21 = −
1
α+γ
· (α(1− α)[δ(1 + γ) + ρ] + γ[ρ+ (1− α)δ])
∆22 = γ
(
ρ+(1−α)δ
α+γ
)
(20)
For the (local) stability analysis we can determine the characteristic equation which is
given by
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∆11 − z ∆12
∆21 ∆22 − z
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = z2 − z(∆11 +∆22) + ∆11∆22 −∆12∆21 = 0.
Notice that tr∆ = ∆11 + ∆22, which corresponds to the trace of the matrix ∆, and
|∆| = ∆11∆22 − ∆12∆21, which equals the determinant of ∆. The roots of the char-
acteristic equation then satisfy
z1, z2 =
tr∆±
√
(tr∆)2 − 4|∆|
2
(21)
where is it well-known that
z1 + z2 = tr∆ and z1z2 = |∆|.
15∆ij was verified, and the determinant in (22) as well as the roots in (23) were calculated in Mathe-
matica 5.0. The source code is available at www.tu-darmstadt.de/∼rehme/low2011/low-1-math.nb.
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Thus, the sum of the roots equals the trace of ∆ and the product of the roots equals its
determinant. In our case it is not difficult to, but cumbersome to derive that16
tr∆ = ρ and |∆| = −(a+ γ)−1 ((1− α)((1− α)δ + ρ)(δ(1 + γ) + ρ)) . (22)
This means that the product of the roots is negative. Hence, one root is positive and
one is negative. Thus, the solution to the characteristic equation requires
2z = ρ±
[
ρ2 + 4(a+ γ)−1 ((1− α)((1− α)δ + ρ)(δ(1 + γ) + ρ))
]1/2
(23)
where z1, the root that takes the positive sign, is positive, and z2, the root that takes the
negative sign, is negative.
The log-linearized solution for ln k then boils down to
ln k = ln k∗ + ζ1 · e
z1t + ζ2 · e
z2t
where ζ1 and ζ2 are arbitrary constants of integration. As z1 > 0, we need that ζ1 = 0
for ln k to approach ln k∗ asymptotically. Then the other constant ζ2, the one that is
associated with z2 < 0, can be obtained from the initial condition ζ2 = ln k0 − ln k
∗.
Thus, the evolution of k is described by
ln k = ln k∗ + [ln k0 − ln k
∗] · ez2t, where z2 < 0.
As ln y = α ln k, one easily verifies that as a consequence output evolves according to
ln y = ln y∗ + [ln y0 − ln y
∗] · ez2t, where z2 < 0.
16The details can be found at www.tu-darmstadt.de/∼rehme/low2011/low-1-math.nb.
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It is well-known that the negative root z2 measures the speed of convergence. The latter
tells one how fast the economy reaches its steady state. It is given by
2z2 = ρ−
[
ρ2 + 4(a+ γ)−1 ((1− α)((1− α)δ + ρ)(δ(1 + γ) + ρ))
]1/2
.
If z2 is a large negative number then convergence takes place quickly. The opposite
holds for small negative values of z2. In appendix B it is shown that z2 is increasing in
γ. Thus, a higher γ implies a less negative z2.
Proposition 2 An increase in the love of wealth is accompanied by a decrease in the
speed of convergence, that is, dz2
dγ
> 0. Thus, an economy with love of wealth takes
longer to attain its steady state than an economy with no love of wealth.
The proposition is interesting because in a normal Cobb-Douglas economy with
logarithmic preferences and no love of wealth and a capital share of one third it is
usually found that the convergence speed is too fast. See, for example, Barro and
Sala–i–Martin (2004), ch. 2. One way out of this problem has been to argue that
capital should be broadly defined. With a higher value of α for broad capital, it can
be shown that the speed of convergence derived from a growth model with consumer
optimization can match the empirically observed convergence speeds. In that context,
the present setup provides an alternative route by arguing that a larger love of wealth
would lead to a slower speed of convergence.
In order to see what the transitional dynamics of this system involve contemplate
the following. Suppose we compare an economy that features no love of wealth with
one that does. In particular, assume that once an economy without love of wealth has
attained its steady state, the social planner will permanently change its preferences
and permanently loves wealth from the position onwards where there was no love of
wealth. Figure 1 displays the qualitative features of the dynamics if there is such a
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preferences shift. (The details of the phase diagram are derived in the appendix.)
Figure 1: The Pase Diagram
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Without love of wealth the steady state position of the economy will be at point A
with γ = 0 and the corresponding steady state capital stock k∗(γ = 0). If the social
planner changes his/her preferences and now features a (permanent) positive love of
wealth, γ > 0, consumption will jump down to point B where it hits the saddle path
associated with the dynamics of the economy with γ > 0. The saddle path is given
by the dotted line with arrows. Thus, in order to attain the new steady state position at
point E with (relatively) higher steady state consumption and capital stock k∗(γ > 0),
the consumption share will jump to a lower level. On the saddle path consumption
and physical capital will rise over time. Thus, the economy will quickly get richer in
comparison to the former steady state at k∗(γ = 0). Furthermore, after the initial jump
down in consumption, the latter will increase with the increase in capital. Eventually,
that is, after some time in the transition period, there will be a a higher consumption
level than the one associated the steady state level of consumption at point A. After
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that period consumption and capital will increase and be higher than in the steady state
position for the economy without love of wealth. As has been analyzed above, the
economy will end up in a new steady state that has higher capital, consumption and
income than in the economy without love of wealth.
6 Decentralization
The setup of the model is such that a convex economy is analyzed. The utility function
and the technology are (quasi)concave functions of its arguments. One can then invoke
the Second Welfare Theorem and argue that the planner solution can be decentralized
as a competitive general equilibrium of a private ownership economy. See Debreu
(1959), Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995), ch. 16, and, more related to our
growth context, Acemoglu (2009), ch. 5. Thus, the social planner solution can be
realized as a market economy. This would only require that the agents have the same
preferences as the social planner and where the social planner would have represented
the agents’ welfare in a benevolent way. Thus, all the results derived from the planner’s
solution would also carry over to the decentralized economy.
For the decentralized economy one can then interpret the more general term “love
of wealth” as representing the “spirit of capitalism” as done in, for example, Zou
(1994).17 Thus, for a competitive market economy we may then conclude that the
‘right‘ level of the “spirit of capitalism” is good in terms of long-run income and con-
sumption. But it may take a little longer to realize these effects in comparison to an
economy with less of that spirit. Furthermore, distinct (‘right’) “spirits of capitalism”
may yield quite different economic outcomes in the long-run.
However, one main insight that the model can capture is that an excessive “spirit
17Notice that Zou contemplates a decentralized economy and also sometimes uses a single, constant
value to represent the “spirit of capitalism”.
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of capitalism” is not good and cannot really be realized as a long-run optimum in a
dynamic economy.
7 Conclusion
In a simple optimal growth framework with Cobb-Douglas production technology and
logarithmic utility which includes wealth as an argument it is analyzed how ‘love of
wealth’ bears on optimal paths in a Solovian growth setup from a social planner’s
perspective. The following findings of the paper are noteworthy.
First, for excessive ‘love of wealth’ no optimum exists for the social planner. If the
intensity of the ‘love of wealth’ is ’right’, i.e. below some critical threshold, there will
be an equilibrium with higher per capita income, consumption and capital in compar-
ison to the standard Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans world. In this case ‘love of wealth’ will
definitely be beneficial for the agents and the social planner. In particular, long-run per
capita consumption will be higher.
Second, with ‘love of wealth’ it is in principle possible to get arbitrarily close to the
Golden Rule level of long-run consumption. The optimum implies that a dynamically
efficient path will be followed and no overaccumulation will take place. There is a
tradeoff between the rate of time preference (impatience) and the model’s indicator of
the ‘love of wealth’. More impatience implies a lower and a higher intensity of the
‘love of wealth’ a higher steady state capital stock.
Third, an economy in which ‘love of wealth’ features in the preferences will have
a slower speed of convergence. Thus, in comparison to the standard model it will
take such an economy longer to attain its steady state. In a transition from a standard
Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans economy to one that starts to like wealth from some point in
time onwards and maintains this liking, it will take some time to realize the eventual
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benefits of having higher consumption and wealth. So initially some agents will not
benefit, but from some time onwards they will.
Fourth, the social planner optimum can be decentralized as a private ownership,
competitive economy. Building on previous work one may then identify ’love of
wealth’ with the “spirit of capitalism”. All the results would then carry over for the
decentralized economy. An important implication of the formal model then is that, as
sometimes argued in recent policy debates on the virtues and vices of capitalism, an
excessive “spirit of capitalism” precludes an optimum. In turn, a ’right’ spirit will be
quite beneficial for the long run.
The present paper should really be viewed as an additional move in the direction
of focussing more on the role of preferences in accumulation processes. Of course, the
analysis faces several caveats. The setup of the model is simple. Alternative utility and
production functions might imply far more complicated equilibria or the lack thereof.
’Love of wealth’ was captured by a constant. This begs the question how changes over
time in the ’love of wealth’ may bear on the optimal paths. These and other extensions
of the model are left for further research.
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A Proof of the transversality condition
First, it is shown that lim
t→∞
e−
∫
t
0
(f ′(kv)−δ)dv = 0 requires f ′(k∞) > δ where k∞ = k
∗ and k∗
denotes the finite steady state capital stock.
Suppose the economy starts off with some initial capital stock k0 < k
∗. At some point
in time, called v∗, we will have k0 < kv∗ < k
∗. By assumption f ′(k) is a smooth and
decreasing function of k. If f ′(k∗) > δ, then it must be that f ′(kv) > δ and f
′(k0) > δ.
Thus, −
∫ t
0 (f
′(kv) − δ)dv will be a negative number. Taking the limit one easily verifies that
lim
t→∞
e−
∫
t
0
(f ′(kv)−δ)dv = 0 if f ′(k∗) > δ and k0 < kv∗ < k
∗.
Suppose the economy starts off with some initial capital stock k0 > k
∗ so that k0 > kv∗ >
k∗. Then it is true that
−
∫ t
0
(f ′(kv)− δ)dv = −
∫ v∗
0
(f ′(kv)− δ)dv −
∫ t
v∗
(f ′(kv)− δ)dv (A1)
Starting from a large k0, we have f
′(k0) < δ. Thus, the expression in first integral on the right
hand side will be a positive, but finite number, as the upper limit of integration is finite and
f ′(k) is a monotone function. Thus,
−
∫ v∗
0
(f ′(kv)− δ)dv = c0
where c0 is a positive constant which is independent of t. Given that f
′(k) is a decreasing
function of k and as we consider k approaching k∗ from k0 > k
∗ there will be some time v∗
with k0 > kv∗ > k
∗ where f ′(kv∗) > δ.
Now the second integral on the right hand side is equivalent to
−
∫ t
v∗
(f ′(kv)− δ)dv = −t
(∫ t
v∗(f
′(kv)dv
t
)
+ δ(t− v∗).
Taking the limit yields
− lim
t→∞
t · lim
t→∞
(∫ t
v∗(f
′(kv)dv
t
)
+ lim
t→∞
δ(t− v∗).
Using l’Hopital’s Rule one then finds
− lim
t→∞
t · f ′(k∞) + lim
t→∞
δ(t− v∗) = − lim
t→∞
(f ′(k∞)− δ)t− δv
∗ = −∞
because f ′(k∞) > δ and k
∗ = k∞. Hence, if f
′(k∗) > δ, then lim
t→∞
e−
∫
t
0
(f ′(kv)−δ)dv = 0.
26
Next, I want to show the convergence of
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
(
γ
ks
)
e−
∫
s
0
(ρ−f ′(kv)+δ)dvds. (A2)
In order to do that we will use a comparison test for convergence as, for instance, presented in
Sydsaeter and Hammond (2002), p. 338, Theorem 9.7.1.18 To this end assume first that
0 < k0 < kv < k
∗
where the steady state capital stock k∗ equals k∞. Thus, we assume that there is some kv
at time v that is larger than the initial capital stock, k0, but less than the steady state capital
stock, k∗ = k∞. The properties of the model and the functions are such that k will indeed
(continuously) grow starting from the initial capital stock until reaching k∗. Thus, we know
that the model implies
lim
v→∞
kv = k
∗
and that the transversality condition requires
f ′(k∗) > δ
which is true in the steady state. Furthermore, notice that f ′(kv) is monotonically decreasing
in kv. Thus, there will be some time v
∗ out of v ∈ [0,∞) where
f ′(kv∗) < δ + ρ (A3)
and we have that f ′(kv∗) ≥ f
′(k∞) = f
′(k∗) as 0 < k0 < kv < k
∗. Given this we can write
(A2) as
lim
t→∞
∫ v∗
0
(
γ
ks
)
e−
∫
s
0
(ρ−f ′(kv)+δ)dvds+ lim
t→∞
∫ t
v∗
(
γ
ks
)
e−
∫
s
0
(ρ−f ′(kv)+δ)dvds.
18The theorem is the following: Suppose that f and g are continuous for all x ≥ a and
|f(x)| ≤ g(x) for all (x ≥ a)
If
∫∞
a
g(x)dx converges, then
∫∞
a
f(x)dx converges, and∣∣∣∣∫ ∞
a
f(x)dx
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∫ ∞
a
g(x)dx.
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The first integral is independent of t and finite as the limits of integration are finite and all the
functions in side the integral are continuous. Thus
lim
t→∞
∫ v∗
0
(
γ
ks
)
e−
∫
s
0
(ρ−f ′(kv)+δ)dvds = c1 where c1 is a finite constant.
Thus, one has to check the second limit expression. This can be decomposed as follows
lim
t→∞
∫ t
v∗
(
γ
ks
)
e−
∫
v
∗
0
(ρ−f ′(kv)+δ)dv−
∫
s
v∗
(ρ−f ′(kv)+δ)dvds.
Now we note that e−
∫
v
∗
0
(ρ−f ′(kv)+δ)dv is independent of s and so t. Furthermore, it is finite
and equal to some constant c2. It can, thus, be pulled out of the limit expression, which yields
c2 · lim
t→∞
∫ t
v∗
(
γ
ks
)
e−
∫
s
v∗
(ρ−f ′(kv)+δ)dvds.
Thus, one only has to check the following integral for convergence.
lim
t→∞
∫ t
v∗
(
γ
ks
)
e−
∫
s
v∗
(ρ−f ′(kv)+δ)dvds = lim
t→∞
∫ t
v∗
(
γ
ks
)
e
∫
s
v∗
(f ′(kv)−ρ−δ)dvds.
In order to do that we note that for v∗ < v < s we have f ′(kv) ≤ f
′(kv∗). Furthermore,∫ s
v∗
(f ′(kv)− ρ− δ)dv ≤
∫ s
v∗
(f ′(kv∗)− ρ− δ)dv = (f
′(kv∗)− ρ− δ)(s− v
∗)
where (f ′(kv∗)−ρ−δ) < 0 by equation (A3). As the exponential function e is a monotonically
increasing function we have
e−
∫
s
v∗
(−f ′(kv)+ρ+δ)dv ≤ e−(−f
′(kv∗ )+ρ+δ)(s−v
∗).
because for v∗ < v < s we have f ′(kv) ≤ f
′(kv∗). This and the fact that
f ′(kv∗)− ρ− δ < 0
implies that the integral features absolute convergence. See, for example, Sydsaeter and Ham-
mond (2002), p. 338, Theorem 9.7.1. For this one needs that∫ ∞
v∗
∣∣∣∣ γks
∣∣∣∣ e− ∫ sv∗ (−f ′(kv)+ρ+δ)dvds ≤ ∫ ∞
v∗
∣∣∣∣ γk0
∣∣∣∣ e−(−f ′(kv∗ )+ρ+δ)(s−v∗)ds (A4)
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The integral on the right hand side is given by∣∣∣∣ γk0
∣∣∣∣ · e(−f ′(kv∗ )+ρ+δ)v∗ · ∫ ∞
v∗
e−(−f
′(kv∗ )+ρ+δ)sds, (A5)
where the expression in front of the integral is a constant. The integral, in turn, is of the type∫ ∞
v∗
e−asds, where a = (ρ+ δ − f ′(kv∗)) > 0. (A6)
Then it is not difficult to verify that∫ ∞
v∗
e−asds = lim
t→∞
∫ t
v∗
e−asds = lim
t→∞
e−as
−a
∣∣∣∣t
v∗
= lim
t→∞
1
−a
(
e−at − e−av
∗
)
=
e−av
∗
a
<∞.
Thus, the integral on the right hand side of equation (A4) converges. But by the comparison
test for convergence it must then be that the integral on the left hand side of equation (A4)
converges, which in turn implies that
lim
t→∞
e−
∫
t
0
(f ′(kv)−δ)dv · lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
(
γ
ks
)
e−
∫
s
0
(ρ−f ′(kv)+δ)dvds = 0. (A7)
This follows from the arguments above and in the text.
Finally it remains to check if the integral (A2) converges if we approach the steady state
from the right, that is, from
∞ > k0 > kv > k
∗.
It is not difficult to see that then−
∫ s
0 (ρ−f
′(kv)+δ)dv will be a negative number in that case.
Going through essentially the same steps as before it is not difficult to see that∫ ∞
v∗
∣∣∣∣ γks
∣∣∣∣ e− ∫ sv∗ (−f ′(kv)+ρ+δ)dvds ≤ ∫ ∞
v∗
∣∣∣ γ
k∗
∣∣∣ e−(−f ′(kv∗ )+ρ+δ)(s−v∗)ds (A8)
is needed for convergence. The integral on the right hand side of the inequality is convergent.
Hence that (A2) also converges if we start from k0 > k
∗
Together with the arguments in the main text, it then follows that the transversality condi-
tion is indeed met if f ′(k∗) > δ and f ′(k∗) < δ + ρ which is true in the steady state.
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B Proof that the convergence speed is decreasing in γ
The negative root is given by
2z2 = ρ−
[
ρ2 + 4(a+ γ)−1 ((1− α)((1− α)δ + ρ)(δ(1 + γ) + ρ))
]1/2
.
This equation can be rearranged as
ρ2 + 4(α+ γ)−1 (∆(δ(1 + γ) + ρ)) = (ρ− 2z2)
2 where ∆ ≡ ((1− α)((1− α)δ + ρ).
Taking the differential with respect to z2 and γ yields(
−4(α+ γ)−2∆(δ(1 + γ) + ρ) + 4(α+ γ)−1δ∆
)
dγ = (−2)(ρ− 2z2)dz2
4(α+ γ)−1∆
[
−(α+ γ)−1(δ(1 + γ) + ρ) + δ
]
dγ = (−2)(ρ− 2z2)dz2.
The expression in brackets is negative, because negativity requires
δ(α+ γ) < δ(1 + γ) + γ
δα < δ + γ
which is true as δα < δ. For the right hand side notice that, as z2 < 0, the expression (ρ−2z2)
is positive. thus, it follows that z2 is increasing in γ, i.e. dz2/dγ > 0. Thus, a higher γ implies
a lower speed of convergence.
C The phase diagram
The qualitative features of the dynamic system are characterized as follows. The system of
differential equations is
k˙
k
= kα−1 −
c
k
− δ and
c˙
c
= αkα−1 − (ρ+ δ) + γ
c
k
.
When k˙ = 0 in the steady state we get c = kα − δk. Taking the differential with respect to k
and c yields
dc = (αkα−1 − δ)dk.
As the expression in the round brackets is positive for low k and negative for sufficiently large
k, the (k˙ = 0)-line will be inverted U-shaped as depicted in figure 1. This is a standard result.
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When c˙ = 0 we get γc = (ρ+ δ)k−αkα. Taking the differential for this expression yields
γ · dc =
(
(ρ+ δ)− α2kα−1
)
dk. (C1)
This means that dcdk |c˙=0 < 0 for very low k and
dc
dk |c˙=0
> 0 for sufficiently large k. For the
arguments in the text initial k for the preference shift corresponds to the one where k∗ is not a
function of γ. The latter is given by
k∗|γ=0 =
(
α
δ + ρ
) 1
1−α
. (C2)
But then it is easy to verify that dcdk |c˙=0 > 0 holds for any k > k
∗
|γ=0. Starting from k
∗
|γ=0 it
also turns out that d
2c
dk2 |c˙=0
> 0 so that the (c˙ = 0)-line is a convex function of k as depicted in
figure 1.
Turning to the dynamic adjustment notice that
dk˙
dc
= −1. (C3)
Thus, if c is slightly above the (k˙ = 0)-line, k will fall. That explains the arrows pointing
westward above that line. Similarly, if c is slightly below the (k˙ = 0)-line, k will rise, which
explains the arrows pointing eastward above the (k˙ = 0)-line.
As concerns the (c˙ = 0)-line notice that
dc˙ =
[
α(α− 1)kα−2 − γ
c
k2
]
c · dk.
The expression in square brackets is negative. Thus, dc˙dk |c˙=0 < 0. So if k is to the right of the
(c˙ = 0)-line, consumption decreases. That explains the downward pointing arrows on the right
of the (c˙ = 0)-line. Furthermore, if k is to the left of the (c˙ = 0)-line, consumption increases.
That explains the upward pointing arrows on the left of the (c˙ = 0)-line.
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